Rybin, Y. Luftwaffe ace Walter Schuck researched / Christer Bergstrom, Yuriy Rybin. - Sweden : [s. l.], 2019. - 190 p. : ill.

WALTER SCHUCK one of its missing pilots had turned up as an agent for the enemy, caused an uproar among the Luftwaffe men. Kaiser’s colleagues in JG 5 were able to convince the interrogators that Kaiser never had had the intention of actually siding with the Soviets, that he only had tricked the enemy. It was a great reunification when “Baby” Kaiser was released and allowed to return to Petsamo. Through Kai­ ser, the men of JG 5 learned that Rudi Muller had been captured by the Soviets. That would become the starting point for wild theories among the pilots of JG 5. Some would interpret the improvement of the Soviet fighter tactics in recent time as an “indication” that “Rudi serves as a fighter trainer with Ivan”. Kaiser also was very critical towards the German soldier’s instruction on behaviour in enemy captivity. He argued that those instructions led a POW to nothing but harsh treatment from the Soviets. According to Kai­ ser’s opinion, it was better to “manoeuvre” instead of acting stubbornly. Hauptmann Schmidt, 9./JG 5’s new Staffelkapitan, listened attentively to what Kaiser had to say. Later, when Schmidt himself ended up in Soviet captivity, he was able to make good use of what he had learned from Kaiser. While Schuck had been on leave in Germany, III./ JG 5 also had exchanged most of its Me 109 F-4s for the newer Me 109 G-2, the “Gustav”. A long-living myth holds that the modification of the Me 109 F into the Me 109 G created an aircraft which was so much heavier that it outweighed other improvements. But in fact, the empty weight of the new Me 109 G-2 was only 407 pounds above the Mel09 F-4’s 5,2751b. In return, the G-2’s Daimler Benz DB 605 A engine was designed to produce 1,475 horse power, compared to the F-4’s 1,350- horse power DB 601 E. Still, Schuck and several of his mates in III./JG 5 felt disappointed with their Me 109 G-2s. This may have another explanation. Just as previously, III./JG 5 received used aircraft. Out of 23 delivered Me 109 G-2s in the spring and early summer of 1943, only one came directly from the factories and the rest were “inherited” from other units - mainly JG 54, which equipped on Fw 190s. Of the twenty-two used Me 109 Gs, no less than seventeen came from the repair stores where they had been patched together after sustaining various degrees of damage with JG 54. The worn old planes were not entirely reliable, and there were a number of flight accidents due to techni­ cal faults. When Schuck returned to Petsamo, this had already happened to Franz Dorr, Richard Steinbach and August Liibking. They all were lucky to survive - Dorr and Steinbach by bailing out over the coast, where they were salvaged, but Liibking was injured. Schuck was hurled into the air fighting again on 18 August 1943, when Fw 190 fighter-bombers repeat­ edly were sent out to destroy the Soviet patrol boats 211 and 222 and the motor torpedo boat PMB-61, which had delivered supplies to the Soviet troops at Eina on the Rybachiy Peninsula. This also resulted in repeated clashes with the Soviet fighters which were assigned to provide the boats with air cover. In the first of these engagements, 7./JG 5 shot down three of 20 IAP’s new Yak-ls without loss, while an Fw 190 limped back to base with battle damage. Schuck’s old friend from the 7th Staffel, Franz Dorr, who in the meantime had been promoted to Leutnant, brought home three victories. Next, the Soviets attempted to ground the German aviation by attacking Petsamo aerodrome, but their for­ mation was intercepted by several Me 109s, and Haupt­ mann Heinrich Ehrler reportedly shot down an old 1-153 biplane fighter-bomber and a P-40. Nevertheless, the nervous German antiaircraft gunners by mistake hap­ pened to shoot down one of the Me 109s, with a Feldwe­ bel of the 6th Staffel getting lost. In the afternoon, Schuck participated when twen­ ty-one Me 109s and Fw 190s took off to attack the Soviet ships. The Germans split into three formations - consist­ ing of four respectively eight and nine aircraft - which in intervals attacked the ships from different directions. Schuck and four other Me 109 pilots escorted four Fw 190s. While the Focke Wulfs dived against the ships, scoring hits on all of them, Schuck and the Messer- schmitt pilots attacked the four Soviet Hurricanes which were on patrol over the boats. These were from 78 IAP/ VVS SF. The Soviet formation leader, Mladshiy Leyt­ enant Valeriy Kiritshenko, was quite experienced. This was his 86th combat flight, and he knew that his four old Hurricanes stood little chance against a superior number of Me 109 Gs. He ordered his men into a Lufbery Circle, although that would not either provide the Soviets with much protection. Knowing exactly how to engage the Soviets in this manoeuvre, Schuck pulled in behind the leading Hurri­ cane. A brief correction of the turning angle, and then he opened fire. The clock on the dashboard in Schuck’s aircraft showed 1616 hours when his 40th victory was registered. While the wounded Kiritshenko brought his crippled Hurricane down to a belly-landing on the shore of the Rybachiy Peninsula, Schuck pulled up before his next attack. By shooting down the leading Hurricane, Schuck had broken the Lufbery circle, and the three remaining Hurricanes flew uncoordinatedly in different directions. At 1622 hours, Schuck’s next victim went down. Again, Schuck decided to gain altitude before his third attack. He pulled the stick and climbed into the thick layer of clouds slightly above. Exactly in that moment, Soviet reinforcement arrived - in the shape of three Hurricanes from 27 IAP/VVS SF. Leading these aircraft was Mladshiy Leytenant Magomet Ikhayev. Like Kiritshenko, he was a quite experienced pilot. Ikhayev had been in action since 1941, and this was his 51st combat mission. But the mistake he made was to try to pursue Schuck’s climbing Messerschmitt into the coulds. Maybe the excitement caused Ikhayev to forget the German tactic of always keeping a Rotte or Schwarm T