Rybin, Y. Luftwaffe ace Walter Schuck researched / Christer Bergstrom, Yuriy Rybin. - Sweden : [s. l.], 2019. - 190 p. : ill.

WALTER SCHUCK 10./JG 5 at Gossen in Norway in 1945. to the British Isles, which enabled the RAF to perform an attack from British bases. But nothing of this was known by JG 5’s Geschwaderkommodore. The Navy failed to inform the Luftwaffe that the battleship had been moved from the Alta fiord, Ehrler explained. Ehrler told Schuck that for many months, British air­ craft had flown in over the Norwegian coast, crossed into Swedish airspace and continued to Leningrad almost every week. The order against intercepting individual reconnaissance or liaison aircraft die to the strained air­ craft fuel situation prevented the Germans from taking off against these aircraft. On Sunday 12 November 1944, the elements of JG 5 which remained in Norway were divided between two airfields. One was at Alta, close to the Alta fiord where the Tirpitz used to be based, but from where Tromso could not be reached. The other one was Bardu­ foss, about 10 - 15 flight minutes south of Tromso. That morning, Oberleutnant Werner Gayko’s 9th Staffel was placed in 10-minute alert at Bardufoss. This Staffel had recently been equipped with Fw 190s, an aircraft which most rookies in the unit were unacquainted with, and was mainly occupied training on the new aircraft. Flying in from the Norwegian Sea, the Lancaster formation was detected by the German radar station at Mosjoen. The Lancasters crossed the Norwegian coast at Bodo, about 150 miles south of Bardufoss. That was where the first error was made. The German air surveil­ lance reported an erroneous geographical code for the place where the British aircraft crossed the coast. Thus, it gave the impression as though they had crossed the coast in the operational area of the fighters based at Alta. At Bodo, the Norwegian territory is only about 25 - 30 miles wide, so after just a few minutes the Lan­ casters entered Swedish airspace. Unfortunately for the Germans, their radar did not cover Swedish terri­ tory. Hence, the Lancasters could turn north in Swed­ ish airspace without this being noticed by the Germans. When they flew in over Norway again, it was over an almost unpopulated wilderness, and thus it took several minutes before any Germans observed them again. By then, the Lancasters were heading at full speed straight for Tromso - only some fifty miles from the border. At Bardufoss, the Fw 190s scrambled. Meanwhile, Oberst­ leutnant Ehrler and his wingman had just landed at Bar­ dufoss with their Me 109s. They were the first to take off. There was no radio communication between the Fw 190s and the Me 109s, and no one knew exactly where the enemy aircraft were. As a measurement of the confusion among the Ger­ mans, Oberleutnant Kurt Schulze, III./JG 5’s adjutant, made preparations to celebrate Ehrler’s 200th victory at Bardufoss. When Ehrler afterward landed, he was frustrated, but only because most of the Fw 190s had failed to make contact with the enemy. Only later were T