Rybin, Y. Luftwaffe ace Walter Schuck researched / Christer Bergstrom, Yuriy Rybin. - Sweden : [s. l.], 2019. - 190 p. : ill.

WALTER SCHUCK be best used as a high speed bomber or a fighter had been raging for over a year. While Kommando Schenk, the Me 262 bomber unit, had achieved a notable success by forcing RAF 127 Wing to abandon its forward base at Grave in the Netherlands, the fighter unit Kommando Nowotny was a failure. The Luftwaffe’s own evaluation of Kommando Nowotny was harsh: “Through an erro­ neous tactic the first single-seat jet fighter Me 262 has achieved no success worth mentioning in the West. Instead, the own losses have been higher than the num­ ber of enemy aircraft that have been shot down. A new tactic must be developed.” The U.S. bombers, which by this time appeared with impudence in their hundreds over Germany in broad daylight - demonstrating the inability of Goring’s fighter force - was the dominant reason to Hitler’s falling confi­ dence in Goring by this time. So in spite of his previous argument that the jet planes would be best used as bomb­ ers, the Me 262 became Goring’s last hope that it would be possible to strike back against the hated American heavy bombers. The Reichsmarschall decided to form a new fighter wing, JG 7, entirely equipped on Me 262s. Kommando Nowotny was renumbered as III./JG 7 and placed under command of Major Erich Hohagen. Oberst Johannes Steinhoff was appointed Geschwaderkommodore of JG 7. But initially the new unit failed to fulfil the expec­ tations. Theo Weissenberger told Schuck that Goring had passed over both Oberst Steinhoff and Major Hoha­ gen and had gone straight to Weissenberger - who was assigned with the task to form the new I./JG 7 - asking him to map out a new and better interception tactic as fast as possible. It was obvious that Goring did not trust Steinhoff or Hohagen. In fact, only a few days later, the poor showings of Steinhoff and Hohagen - at least in the eyes of Goring - had those two officers removed from JG 7. Instead Theo Weissenberger was made JG 7’s Geschwaderkommodore in January 1945. Hohagen was succeeded by Major Rudolf Sinner, one of Schuck’s old acquaintances from JG 3’s Erganzungsgruppe in 1940. Of course Weissenberger wanted such a skilful fighter pilot as Schuck to join his unit, and Schuck was interested in the suggestion. Weissenberger promised that he would try to have Schuck transferred to I./JG 7, and with those words the two friends parted as Schuck returned to JG 5 in January 1945. What Schuck returned to in Norway was something completely different than he had expected. The great surprise was not that III./JG 5 had left the Eastern Front, nor the severe beating it had sustained. In October 1944, just after Schuck had left Petsamo, the Soviet 14th Army had initiated its great offensive in the Far North. In less than four weeks, JG 5 lost thirty-seven fighter planes - most of which were due to hostile action - with ten pilot casualties in the Far North. By retreat­ ing behind the Lyngen fiord near Tromso in northern Norway, the German 20th Mountain Army managed to detach itself from its Soviet opponent - leaving the whole Norwegian province of Finnmarken as an unoccupied desolate wasteland, ruined through Terboven’s scorched earth tactic, between itself and the Soviet 14th Army, which halted in Kirkenes. Thus, Schuck was not surprised to find that his 10th Staffel now was based on the Norwegian west coast - or to be more exact, at Gossen near Molde, about 250 miles northwest of Oslo and around seven hundred miles from Petsamo. The great shock to Schuck was that he found that the Geschwaderkommodore Oberstleutnant Ehrler was jailed. Ehrler had been blamed for the destruction of Tirpitz, and had been sentenced to four years and two months imprisonment. By this time, Ehrler was locked in a cell at Akershus fortress in Oslo. Schuck immediately decided to talk to Terboven. On 8 or 10 January 1945, he met the Reichskommissar in Oslo. Terboven met the pilot with a triumphant look on his face. “Well, it’s your trusted Kommodore’s fault that we lost the Tirpitz, ” Terboven said. Schuck had to control himself and just said: “Herr Reichskommissar, that I find hard to believe.” “You see,” answered Terboven, “by being so eager to achieve his 200th victory your Kommodore failed to provide the Tirpitz with a sufficient fighter cover.” Terboven explained that the conclusion drawn by the military court was that instead of organising an adequate fighter shield to protect the Tirpitz against the British Lancasters which had attacked on 12 November 1944, Ehrler’s personal ambitions had led him to hunt his 200th air victory. “That sounds incredible!” Schuck exclaimed. “Ehrler could have had 250 victories if he wished. I’ve seen him step aside and lead many new pilots to their first victories!” Schuck asked Terboven for permission to visit Ehrler at Akershus, and Terboven arranged a visitor permit for him. Schuck went to Akershus that same afternoon, in company with a secretary. He met a completely broken man in the prison. But Schuck asked Ehrler to tell the whole story, and so he did. In the meantime, the secre­ tary wrote down every single word. First of all, Ehrler explained, he had not been informed that the Tirpitz had been transferred from the Alta fiord - where it had been based for several years. The successful attack against the Tirpitz on 12 November 1944 had been carried out by the same Lan­ casters from RAF 9th and 617th squadrons, with the same kind of “Tallyboy” bombs, as during the attack on 15 September 1944. However, until 15 September 1944, the Tirpitz had lay in the deep Alta fiord in northern Norway, where steep hill sides made bombing attacks extremely difficult. But following the 15 September attack, the battleship was moved farther south - to Sor- botn, off Hakoya near Tromso. There it was moored on a great sand bank, without any natural protection as in the Alta fiord. This also brought the Tirpitz 200 miles closer