Рыбин, Ю. В. Советские асы на Харрикейнах в годы Второй Мировой Войны / Юрий Рыбин . – [Б. м. ] : Osprey Publishing, 2012. – 97 с. : ил., портр. – Англ. яз.

C HA PTER ONE 12 vulnerable to oil contamination in flight as a result. All these defects placed an unacceptable burden on groundcrewmen in operational units. The Yak-1’s lack of a radio —RSI-4 transmitter-receivers were fitted to every tenth aircraft, the others having just a receiver —imposed a serious tactical disadvantage as well. The aircraft also had inadequate range, even when lightened beyond practical limits. These factors meant that upon encountering enemy fighters, Yak pilots were reluctant to fight and would break off combat at the earliest opportunity. That was in contrast to those flying Hurricanes or P-40s. As far as the Hurricane’s operational qualities were concerned, it is hardly surprising that they were ahead of its contemporaries in most respects. While the British aircraft had been subject to a continuous process of development since the mid-1930s, the later fighters in Soviet service, whether imported or of indigenous design, were still ‘raw’. In 1942 the Yak-1, LaGG-3, P-39 and P-40 were handicapped by design and operational defects. The Hurricane’s principal drawback, however, was its lack o f speed. But how important was this factor in air combat on the Soviet-German front in 1941-42? The outcome of an engagement at this early stage of the conflict was normally dictated less by outright speed and more by the tactics employed, and these depended on the technical characteristics of the participating fighters. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that most of the principal fighters in the Red Army Air Force inventory —the Yak-1, LaGG-3 and P-40 — lagged behind their main rival, the Bf 109F, in terms ofmaximum speed and rate of climb. The majority of Soviet pilots rarely dared enter a climbing dogfight even in the Airacobra, which was only marginally slower than the Bf 109 both in speed and rate of climb. Therefore, irrespective of the type of aircraft they were flying, Soviet pilots usually found themselves fighting on the turn. And it was in the turn that the Hurricane enjoyed an advantage over any Bf 109. Most combats between Soviet and German fighters in 1941-42 began with a head-on formation attack. Usually, a ‘defensive circle’would then be formed in which pilots would protect the tail of the aircraft flying in front of them. They were also able to repel attacks from ahead. In a defensive circle the parameters o fmaximum speed and rate o f climb had no practical significance. This meant that in combat with Bf 109s the Hurricane was not disadvantaged in comparison with any of the faster or more manoeuvrable fighters operated by the Red Army Air Force at that time. Firepower was often the decisive factor, and the Hurricane in Soviet service had no equal in this respect. In fact the Hurricane, with its two 20 mm ShVAK guns and two 12.7 mm large calibre UBK machine guns producing a weight of fire of 3.84 kg (8.45 lb) per second, not only surpassed all single-engined Soviet fighters but also its German opponents. The Bf 109F, armed with just one 20 mm MG 151 cannon and two 7.92 mm MG 17 machine guns, produced a weight of fire of 1.99 kg (4.38 lbs) per second. Consequently, its pilots declined to engage Hurricanes in head-on attacks. The British fighter’s sturdy construction and relative bulk also made it a stable gun platform, being able to pour a concentrated stream o f fire onto its target. This feature made the aircraft a useful bomber destroyer. © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com