Korelsky, V. F. Fish, fishermen and fish industry in Russia / V. F. Korelsky. - Bremen : Krebs, [1993?]-.

The problems of market infrastructure demand much attention. Today, its separate elements (stock exchanges, auctions, joint-stock companies) arise spontaneously and sometimes use piratic methods, i.e., earn more profit and that too immediately. To a considerable degree, this can be explained by the lag of legislation, the uncertainty of relationships between the planning and the market methods. When the state orders were reduced, a considerable part of production turned to be homeless and quickly fell in the sphere of activity of enterprising smart operators. The system of state supply could not reorganize its activity quickly enough to ensure the free trade of the remaining part of the production, and thus cooperatives and stock exchanges appeared that could realize this production and that became a dominant force in the market, dictating their own prices 3 or 4, or even more, times higher than the listed. Since, in the final analysis, it is the population who has to pay for these prices, it is necessary to work out rules that would regulate the activity of the stock exchanges and auctioneers in order to protect the interests of the consumers without fettering the initiative of businessmen. Of special importance in the making of market relations are the problems of property, its privatization, the aims of which is to change the property relations, to form the market motivation of labor and to stimulate the activity of businessmen. Whereas the questions concerning small trade enterprises and consumer services are, more or less, clear, the matter is much more complicated regarding large industries. But the latter constitute the main amount of the cost of production funds and their state will define the property relations in the country as well as the rates of development of the market economy. The conversion of large enterprises into joint-stock companies must not be simplified; we must not assume that the feeling of ownership will automatically arise and change the attitude of workmen to the use of capital assets and material resources. We must bear in mind that in many capitalist countries various theories of business relations have been worked out long ago and are successfully applied to the formation of the assiduous attitude to the manufacturing resources. We have still to work out such theories as applied to the psychology of broad masses of people who have been brought up on the concepts of public ownership of the means of production. These theories must take into account the changes that will occur in the working collectives when the ideological obligation of consciousness- raising labor is replaced by the technocratic demands of the new administration whose role and significance will rise sharply under the market conditions. First of all, this is due to the fact that under market conditions a joint-stock company itself answers for its actions, and therefore its administration (the president/governing bodies) is responsible for the results of functioning of the enterprise only to the stockholders through dividends. To increase the dividends, it will place high demands on all the departments of the enterprise and the latter, in turn, in a sort of chain reaction, will place demands on the whole personnel in order to ensure the completion of the irreproachable work, the fulfillment of all orders, the lowering of production costs, etc. In this connection, the administration of the company must keep a certain distance relative to the stockholders relating to the problems of organization of business and the demands of the employees. If all this is realized, the companies on lease and the joint-stock companies will raise their efficiency and will soon 5 4