Korelsky, V. F. Fish, fishermen and fish industry in Russia / V. F. Korelsky. - Bremen : Krebs, [1993?]-.

and the organization at the enterprises of the region or the basin of everything necessary for the creation of market mechanisms, and for the satisfaction of the requirements of the population. There is no need to invent the mechanism of self-financing. The main ideas are prompted by the informal, not completely regulated by the law, relations of basin associations and of enterprises to one another as well as to economic organizations that spring up spontaneously, and to the population. If we study attentively the essence of these relations, we shall see that they can be used to overcome the obstacles in the way of economic initiative put upon by the system of authorities which is genetically less dynamic than the actual life. The relations of this kind should be called a self-organizing economy as distinct from the “shadow” economy that admits of things which cannot be called economic in the proper sense of the word (bribery, misappropriation, etc.). When the activity is pseudocommercial and distributive, the mood of the market permeates the planned distribution and generates the monster of corruption which washes clean its unjust profits by means of the pseudoprivatization of the state property. This has become possible because of the irresponsibility of the apparatus of the executive power. Under appropriate conditions, the commercialization of economic activity can serve as the basis of the transition mechanism that would make it possible to solve a number of problems and, at the same time, orient the economic interaction of the fish industrial basins of Russia on the coordination of their interests. This means the transformation of directive activity into the process of negotiations concerning a peculiar sale-and-purchase of economic alternatives existing between the relations of the regions of Russia and of enterprises of various fish industrial basins. Its result is a list of economic obligations of partners, rather than directives to “lower levels,” to one another and to those who delegate them the authorities. The logic of this process is as follows. The work collective of an enterprise that is located in a certain territory can lawfully dispose of its property and production but the local authorities, which stand up for their interests, have the right to prohibit a certain kind of economic activity, to restrict its scale and export. This is a reality that must be taken into account In order not to violate the normal functioning of the fish industrial bases, it is necessary to make it possible for the center to stimulate the local organs for a compromise by negotiating and then defining certain deductions from the centralized funds into the local budget in the form of payments for the weakening of these restrictions covered by goods needed by the counter-agent The reaction to the establishment and correction of rates of these deductions and the corresponding limits imposed on the import of material resources to the territory will be in the form of alteration of the corresponding restrictions, in the form of peculiar quotas for the development of different industries in the region and for the export of production. As a result of several rounds of such negotiations, a situation will be attained in which none of the territories will want to change its quotas if the other participants do not do the same. Thus, their economic interests will be coordinated. 1 4 2