Korelsky, V. F. Fish, fishermen and fish industry in Russia / V. F. Korelsky. - Bremen : Krebs, [1993?]-.

situation is typical now of more than 10 thousand American companies, in which about l.S thousand workers are the share-holders of about half the joint-stock capital. American economists point out that the closest connection between the buying of a part of the capital by the workers and the growth of the profit is observed in the companies where this part exceeds 50% The national center of the property of the people employed in the USA analyzed the results of the activity of 260 highly technological companies. They found out that, in the cases when more than a half of the joint stock belonged to workers, the results of the activity increased 2-4 times quicker than in ordinary firms. However, it was noted that not the sale of the property of the company led to the increase in the profit and in labor productivity but the creation of a mechanism of realization of the acquired property. And the main thing is the participation of workers in the management of the enterprise. The self-managed firms are considerably more efficient than the traditional ones even when the level of efficiency is calculated with the use of a small number of parameters. The experience of the acquisition of property by those employed in the USA shows that the democratization of the production process, the participation of workers in decision making give positive results. The selling of property according to the plans of participation is only a material basis of this process. It has turned out, however, that the most complicated and contradictory thing is to ensure a real control over production. In the opinion of the American economists Gamson and Levin, the problem of giving workers the real voting rights in defining the strategy of the firm and its current activities will seriously restrain the development of the property of the employed. The loss of the management control with the increase in the proportion of the employed in the joint-stock company is one of the most moot points. Many American economists are sceptical as regards the formation of joint-stock funds of working people and think that the workers' participation in the management makes it easier for the corporation to obtain loans at low interest rates, secure decrease in income-tax payments, increase the regular inflow of finances and extend pension funds, or to create a market for share-holders without changing anything in the area of control over the production process. A serious snag in further distribution of the joint stock property of people lies in the fact that the participation in the management of an enterprise requires quite a different level of the general and basic economic culture of the workers with deep knowledge and understanding. When the quality of manpower is low, the industrial democracy becomes anarchic. The distribution of the participation plans is supported by the American government since the decentralization of management and the division of property obviates the possibility of centralization of power and the totalitarianism. The traditionally organized firms have to distribute dividends among the external share-holders and fight for these investments with the competitive firms. However, an enterprise where the majority of share-holders are workers of the enterprise does not pursue this object. It is precisely here, in the framework of the reinvestment of the wages, and not in the maximization of the short-term return to the share-holders, that the participation of the workers in the property demonstrates its unique advantage. 1 1 0