Фёдоров, П. В. Северный вектор в российской истории : центр и Кольское Заполярье в XVI-XX вв. / П. В. Фёдоров ; Федер. агентство по образованию, Мурм. гос. пед. ун-т.

374 П.В. Федоров •Северный вектор в российской истории the first steps to the regular communication between Mo sc ow and strategic resources of the North as well as to "ideas about the sea" in the national projects. Itwas in XVIII century wh en these ideas were implemented in the policy of Peter I,though the North only suffered after the major sea gate was transferred to the Baltic. Attitude of the center to the North began to lose any significance as they were subject to the Baltic strategy and after the strategic focus was transferred to the south they disap peared at all. One of the reasons to it was connected to the prevailing view that severe natural and climatic conditions of the North are connected with its strategic potential, and also to the belief that the Baltic can replace the North. However, the situation with the North in XVI-XVII centuries was not the same in the next period: in XVIII and especially in XIX centuries the potential was accumulated which later in 1894 allowed Minister of finance S.Yu. Vitte create at a state level a new conception of the strategic value of the North. The scientific basis of it was the recent scientific explanation to the fact that the Barents Sea did not freeze. Unique strategic at tributes of the Northern periphery absent in the Baltic and Black Seas, i.e. opportunity of a free access to the ocean from the Murmansk coast, started to be viewed as conditions for creation in the Kola North a state complex with a big ocean port, naval base, railway and industries. For some itwas a way to improve position of Russia in the world, for oth ers — a way to save the 3rc^ Rome. Russia started to implement this project unprecedented for the northern latitudes only in the extreme situation of World War I.Built in 1915-1916 Murmansk railway opened a way to the ocean which was blocked by the en em y in the Baltic and Black Seas, and its unofficial name «the second Dardanelles» reminded about the outrageous situation with the northern routes under Peter I.Due to «the second Dardanelles» Russia newly began to see original, geographic North, discovering importance of its territories located close to the Arctic Ocean. However, after the Civil War military and strategic importance of the northern periphery began to fade again. Only due to the fact that natural resources ofthe Kola North were included into the system of economic interests of the Soviet state the region did not stop the dialogues with the center and became a kind of a «pilot project» in the plans of the USSR on reclamation of the Arctic zone. It helped the North to show its connection to the Russian activities in Northern Europe at the end of the 30-ies. The proof of itwas creation of the Northern fleet. Italso helped to develop certain attitude to the north-eastern direction, the development of which began after Murmansk was turned into a unique base for regular studies of the Arctic. World War I repeated the effect ofthe Dardanelles and gave back to the Murmansk railway its military and strategic importance. Itended with a different balance of the Baltic and Northern focuses. It was as ifthe North w o n the right for strategic independence